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CERTIFICATION OF COUNSEL 
I hereby certify that this Petition For Rehearing is presented 
in good faith and not for the purpose of delay. 
STRONG & HANNI 
POST KIRBY NOONAN & SWEAT LLP 
By: 
'S. Baird Morgan 
Attorneys forCDef^fidants-Appellees, 
Linsco Financial Services, Inc. and 
Linsco Private Ledger Corporation 
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS 
The names of all parties to the proceedings in the lower court 
are set forth in the caption of the case on appeal. 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 7 8-2A-3(2)(j), as amended. 
This Petition For Rehearing is filed pursuant to Rule 35, Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, and pursuant to the Stipulation 
Granting Enlargement of Time to file this Petition. 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendants-Appellees, Linsco Financial Services, Inc. and Linsco 
Private Ledger Corporation (collectively referred to as "Private 
Ledger") hereby submit this Petition For Rehearing with respect to 
this Court's MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official Publication) [the 
"Memo Decision"] filed April 18, 1996 in this matter. A copy of the 
Memo Decision is attached as Appendix A. 
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For the reasons set forth herein, this Court should grant a 
rehearing to correct the errors of law and fact in its Memorandum 
Decision which reversed the trial court's granting of summary 
judgment in favor of Private Ledger. This Court has misconstrued one 
comment by the trial court, while ignoring the trial court's thorough 
analysis of the uncontroverted evidence, and has also ignored at 
least five federal and state decisions which have resolved, as a 
matter of law, the same issue presented here in favor of the 
securities broker-dealers. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT OVERLOOKED OR MISAPPREHENDED POINTS 
OF LAW AND FACT IN ITS DECISION 
As noted in this Court's decision, "The trial court granted 
defendants' summary judgment motion, concluding that Private Ledger 
was not liable, as a matter of law, for the acts or omissions of 
defendant Harry." Plaintiffs' claims all arise from an investment 
each made in May 19 88 in Red River, an Arizona real estate limited 
partnership. Plaintiffs' investments in Red River were made by 
defendant Ronald Allen Harry ("Harry"), to whom each plaintiff had 
granted a discretionary power of attorney to make such investments. 
The Red River investments were made from cash each plaintiff had in 
an IRA account in the First National Bank ("FNB") of Onaga, Kansas. 
[R. 463-465] 
Harry was an independent contractor pursuant to a written 
Registered Representative Agreement with Private Ledger. [R. 565, 
52 3] It is undisputed that, for purposes of Private Ledger's 
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records, no mention was ever made of Red River, and the transfer of 
plaintiffs' funds to bank accounts in their names at FNB in Kansas 
was entirely proper. [R. 567-568] It was after the plaintiffs' 
funds were in their individual accounts at FNB that the Red River 
investments were made by Harry. [R. 463-65, 600, 605] Plaintiffs 
did not produce a single shred of evidence indicating that Private 
Ledger had any knowledge of, or involvement in, the Red River 
transactions. 
This Court, in reversing the trial court's summary judgment 
ruling concluded: 
In this case, the trial court's reasoning that "one cannot 
be an agent of the principal at the same time engaging in 
conduct which is criminally fraudulent," is simply not a 
correct statement of the law. Questions of fact remain as 
to the existence of the agency relationship between Harry 
and defendants and the scope of Harry's authority. 
Private Ledger respectfully submits that this Court erred in 
misconstruing, and then basing its entire ruling on, a single 
statement made by the trial court based on the unique facts here, and 
in particular erred in ignoring the trial court's thorough analysis 
of the uncontroverted evidence in this case. 
At the time of granting summary judgment, the trial court, the 
Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki, stated in considerable detail his 
analysis of the uncontroverted evidence presented in connection with 
Private Ledger's summary judgment motion. That analysis is 
particularly pertinent to this Petition, and demonstrates that the 
trial court was making its ruling regarding the lack of liability as 
to Private Ledger based on a clear showing by Private Ledger 
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(including plaintiffs' own depositions), and a complete absence of 
any contrary admissible evidence from the plaintiffs: 
More critically, though, is my analysis as to the matter of 
law as to whether or not Private Ledger should be held 
liable. I have no argument with Mr. Coke when he states to 
me the general proposition regarding respondeat superior, 
no controlling person. 
The guestion I have is just how far can that be reached 
when the defendant in this matter. Private Ledger, has gone 
to what I think is more than sufficient steps to ensure 
that activities by their registered agent are pursuant to 
their policies. 
It is apparent that Red River was not an approved security 
from Private Ledger, that there was no authorization from 
Private Ledger to Mr. Harry to go beyond that policy. In 
essence, it appears that when a registered representative 
of a brokerage firm clearly violates the firm's policies 
and engages in unauthorized activities without the 
knowledge of Private Ledger in this matter, I just cannot 
see how liability can be imposed upon the principal. 
Private Ledger, in this matter. 
It did not appear on Private Ledger statements regarding 
the purchase of this. There may have been indication that 
the money was transferred but that was all that was done 
and that knowledge was to the plaintiffs in this matter. 
Private Ledger, once again, never approved of the Red River 
investment. It did not appear —as I said the plaintiffs' 
investments were not run through the Private Ledger 
accounts to the extent of appearing on Private Ledger 
statements. There had been no fees, no collections and no 
prior knowledge of Private Ledger of the activity of Mr. 
Harry. 
The fact Mr. Harry was criminally convicted of defrauding 
Private Ledger crystallizes my opinion in that one cannot 
be an agent of the principal at the same time engaging in 
conduct which is criminally fraudulent. They are mutually 
exclusive actions and terms. 
The apparent reliance that Mr. Coke wishes the court to 
accept regarding the activities of Messrs. Brgoch and 
Isaacs, I do not have to reach the point that they are 
sophisticated and/or somehow registered investors by the 
fact they have had a long track record with Mr. Harry. 
They did, in fact, move from different brokerage firms Mr. 
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Harry was employed with. Their reliance, in my opinionF 
was on Mr. Harry and just incidentally with the firm that 
he was employed by. 
I think that in this situation, Private Ledger has done 
anything and everything they could to ensure their 
registered agents are actually agents of them in doing what 
their policies indicate that they are allowed to do, i.e. 
trade in approved securities, have commissions paid 
pursuant to that, have knowledge of the operations that the 
agents are doing in relations to the brokerage house and 
the investors, and indicating which ones and gaining 
thorough knowledge of activity, then, somehow ratifying the 
agent's position in this matter. I find that has not been 
done so as a matter of law . . . . 
Reporter's Transcript dated May 17, 1994 (emphasis added), a copy of 
which is attached as Appendix B to this Petition. 
As stated in Private Ledger's Brief [pp. 1-2], the following 
issues for review were presented on appeal, but overlooked in this 
Court's Memo Decision: 
1. Did the trial court properly rule that a principal 
cannot cloak its agent with apparent authority in one 
transaction where the agent has acted so far out of the scope of 
the authority granted to him that he has been criminally 
convicted of defrauding his principal in that specific 
transaction? 
2. Did plaintiffs present sufficient admissible evidence 
to show that a reasonable investor of like experience as 
plaintiffs would and did reasonably believe that Ronald Harry 
("Harry") had apparent authority from Private Ledger to sell 
interests in the Red River Mountain Limited Partnership ("Red 
River") where the undisputed evidence showed: 
(a) Harry signed an independent contractor agreement with 
Private Ledger stating he would only sell securities which had 
been approved for sale by Private Ledger; 
(b) Private Ledger's written policies prohibited the 
practice of "selling away", and Harry executed a separate 
written memorandum agreeing to comply with that policy; 
(c) The Red River investment was never approved for sale 
by Private Ledger; 
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(d) The Red River investment by plaintiffs was not made 
through Private Ledger; 
(e) The Red River investment never appeared on any of 
plaintiffs' Private Ledger account statements; 
(f) Private Ledger's name did not appear on any of the Red 
River offering or pre-offering materials; 
(g) Private Ledger received no commissions or fees on the 
Red River investments; 
(h) Private Ledger had no knowledge that Harry, who had 
been plaintiffs' broker with other brokerage firms for over ten 
years, had solicited and caused plaintiffs to invest in Red 
River and Private Ledger promptly terminated Harry when Private 
Ledger learned that information; and 
(i) Plaintiffs, after learning that Harry had caused their 
money (in bank accounts in Kansas) to be invested in a limited 
partnership (Red River) purportedly without their approval, 
still made no inquiry or complaint to Private Ledger? 
This Court's Memo Decision overlooks all of the uncontroverted 
evidence set forth in paragraph 2 above (which the trial court had 
analyzed), and ignores the uniform, reported decisions holding, as a 
matter of law, that a securities broker-dealer has no liability under 
the ostensible or apparent agency theory for such wrongdoing on the 
part of one of its registered representatives. Indeed, if this 
Court's decision were uniformly applied in Utah, no securities 
broker-dealer, or indeed any employer, could ever obtain summary 
judgment, despite completely uncontradicted facts and evidence such 
as presented here. It is clear from reviewing the entire reasoning 
by Judge Iwasaki, rather than misconstruing a single comment, that he 
correctly stated the applicable law: "In essence, it appears that 
when a registered representative of a brokerage firm clearly violates 
the firm's policies and engages in unauthorized activities without 
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the knowledge of Private Ledger in this matter, I just cannot see how 
liability can be imposed upon the principal, Private Ledger, in this 
matter." [App. B, pp. 3-4] 
II. THIS COURT OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT THE TRIAL 
COURT'S ANALYSIS WAS SUPPORTED BY UNCONTROVERTED 
EVIDENCE PRODUCED BY DEFENDANT. AND NOT 
CONTROVERTED BY PLAINTIFFS 
A. The Court's Memo Decision Ignores Rule 56(e) Of The Utah 
Rules Of Civil Procedure, And Cases Construing That Rule 
Private Ledger's moving papers demonstrated that it was entitled 
to summary judgment on the ground that Harry was not the actual or 
ostensible agent of Private Ledger in connection with his activities 
with plaintiffs involving Red River. Having made that showing, Rule 
56(e) then shifted the burden to plaintiffs: 
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as 
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon 
the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his 
response, by affidavit or as otherwise provided in this 
rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, 
summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against 
him.1 
In this case, Private Ledger produced extensive evidence as to 
the policies and procedures it utilized, the prohibition against 
"selling away" activities, the fact that the Red River investment was 
never approved by Private Ledger for sale by its independent 
1
 In Thayne v. Beneficial Utah, Inc., 874 P.2d 120 (Utah 1994), the Utah Supreme 
Court affirmed summary judgment, noting "Under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) the 
burden then shifted to Thayne to provide some evidence, by affidavit or otherwise, 
in support of the essential elements of his claim." [874 P.2d at 124] Similarly, 
in a decision by the Utah Supreme Court filed February 14, 1996, Harline v. Barker, 
et al., 912 P.2d 433, 1996 Utah LEXIS 11 (Utah 1996), the Court affirmed summary 
judgment, citing Rule 56(e) and Thayne, and noting: 
On the other hand, we cannot turn a blind eye to the non moving party's 
evidence when that party chooses to respond to the summary judgment. In 
this case, Harline's own evidence compels us to affirm the trial court's 
grant of summary judgment. [912 P.2d at 445] 
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contractor registered representatives [R. 567], and its actions in 
immediately terminating Harry upon learning of his activities in 
connection with Red River. [R. 568-569] 
Plaintiffs' only theory against Private Ledger was that Harry 
was somehow the ostensible agent of Private Ledger, but plaintiffs 
produced no admissible evidence raising a genuine issue of fact to 
suggest that plaintiffs had made their investment in Red River in 
reasonable reliance on the fact that Harry was selling the investment 
as an authorized agent of Private Ledger. It is respectfully 
submitted that this important distinction has been overlooked by this 
Court in its Memo Decision. More importantly, this Court overlooked 
the threshold requirement to establish ostensible agency, or even 
raise a triable issue of fact on that issue, with respect to 
securities brokerage firms. 
Initially, it is significant that both plaintiffs filed 
affidavits in connection with their opposition to Private Ledger's 
summary judgment motion. [R. 599-608] In paragraph 3 of those 
affidavits, both plaintiffs admit that "on or about May or June of 
1988 I received a statement from Private Ledger showing only that on 
5/9/88 federal funds were sent to FNB Onaga in the amount of 
$30,600." Both plaintiffs admitted that the only information which 
they received from Private Ledger with respect to this investment was 
a Private Ledger statement showing that monies had been transferred 
from their Private Ledger accounts to an IRA account in a bank in 
Onaga, Kansas, in the plaintiffs' names. It is undisputed that 
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Private Ledger had no knowledge tha t those funds were going to l a t e r 
be used to make an investment in the Red River par tnership . 2 
The t r i a l court was required to consider the evidence presented 
in support of the motion, and the matters submitted in opposition 
t h e r e t o . As the fu l l t r ansc r ip t of the t r i a l cou r t ' s reasoning above 
demonstrates, p l a i n t i f f s presented no evidence to show tha t they had 
in fact made t h e i r Red River investments in the bel ief tha t Harry was 
doing so as the authorized agent of Pr ivate Ledger. The absence of 
such evidence i s f a t a l to t h e i r apparent agency claim. 
I I I . THIS COURT ERRED IN ITS ANALYSIS OF THE OSTENSIBLE 
AGENCY OR APPARENT AUTHORITY ISSUE 
This Court 's Memo Decision concludes tha t "whether an agency 
r e l a t ionsh ip ex i s t s and the scope of the agent ' s author i ty are 
questions of fact to be determined by a jury in a l l but the c l ea re s t 
cases ." [p. 2] However, none of the cases c i ted by t h i s Court 
involved s ecu r i t i e s brokerage firms or "se l l ing away" a c t i v i t i e s , and 
t h i s was "the c lea res t of cases" warranting summary judgment. 
Moreover, t h i s Court 's analysis i s c lear ly contrary to tha t of 
numerous cases including the decision by the Mississippi Supreme 
Court in FSC Secur i t ies Corp. v. McCormack, 630 So. 2d 979 (Miss. 
19 94), where the Court noted: 
Federal and s t a t e courts in other ju r i sd ic t ions have been 
re luc tan t to find broker-dealers v icar iously l i a b l e for the 
As t h i s Cou r t ' s Memo Decision po in t s ou t , t he evidence e s t a b l i s h e d 
" p l a i n t i f f s ' concession t h a t they knew of some wrongdoing immediately upon t h e i r 
r e c e i p t of t h e f i r s t s ta tement sent by t he Bank of Onaga . . . . " S i g n i f i c a n t l y , 
p l a i n t i f f s made no complaint t o P r i v a t e Ledger about t h e i r funds having been inves ted 
from t h e i r FNB accounts i n t o Red River and made no at tempt t o communicate with P r i v a t e 
Ledger in any form, fu r the r confirming t h e i r knowledge t h a t t h i s was not a t r a n s a c t i o n 
approved by P r i v a t e Ledger or an investment which involved P r i v a t e Ledger. 
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underhanded dealings of registered representatives in 
circumstances similar to the case sub judice. These cases 
have turned on the doctrine of apparent authority. 
Apparent authority is to be determined from the acts of the 
principal and requires reliance and good faith on the part 
of the third party. [Citation,] . . . The first element 
of apparent authority is whether the principals knowingly 
and/or negligently permitted their agents to claim they 
were acting within the scope of their authority. This 
element involves the conduct of the principal rather than 
that of the plaintiff. [Id. at 985 (emphasis added).] 
In rejecting the claim of apparent authority by plaintiffs, the 
FSC Securities Court considered a record which is identical to the 
evidence here, and made the same observation made by the trial court 
here in granting summary judgment: 
The McCormacks [plaintiffs] had no contact with FSC [the 
broker-dealer], made no effort to follow their investment 
through FSC and relied on and dealt only with Manuel [the 
registered representative] . . . . 
The record clearly indicates that Manuel as well as FSC 
Securities' other registered representatives act within the 
scope of employment only when soliciting or transacting 
business in securities approved for sale by the broker-
dealer. [Id. at 986.] 
As pointed out in FSC Securities, and other cases cited to the 
trial court and on appeal, the "first element of apparent authority 
is whether the principals knowingly and/or negligently permitted 
their agents to claim they were acting within the scope of their 
authority," and "involves the conduct of the principal rather than 
that of the plaintiff." Private Ledger produced overwhelming 
evidence that it had not done so, and that it had, as the trial court 
noted, taken every reasonable step to prevent such unauthorized 
conduct. [R. 564-568, 508-510] Moreover, plaintiffs produced no 
evidence that Harry claimed to be involved in the Red River 
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transaction on behalf of Private Ledger.3 In the absence of any 
contrary evidence, the trial court correctly concluded that the 
evidence was uncontroverted and that Private Ledger did not have any 
liability as a matter of law, just as numerous federal and state 
courts had previously determined in other cases involving securities 
broker-dealers. 
IV. THIS COURT'S DECISION ERRONEOUSLY RELIES ON 
A GENERAL RULE OF LAW IN THE HORROCKS CASE, WHICH IS 
CLEARLY DISTINGUISHABLE HERE 
In its Decision, this Court cites Horrocks v. Westfalia 
Systemat, 892 P.2d 14 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), for the general rule that 
"a principal is liable for the injuries resulting from the fraud of 
its agent, committed during the existence of the agency, or within 
the scope of the agent's actual or apparent authority." Private 
Ledger respectfully submits that the general rule of law recited in 
Horrocks, based on entirely different evidence, is not applicable, 
particularly in contrast to the numerous cases involving securities 
broker-dealers which have resolved this very issue of non-liability 
for "selling away" activities adverse to plaintiffs as a matter of 
law.4 
3
 It is significant that plaintiffs had taken the deposition of Jonathan Boynton 
(the individual in charge of Private Ledger's Compliance Department) in this action, 
whose affidavit (copy attached as Appendix C) supported Private Ledger's summary 
judgment motion, and could not, in their opposition to the summary judgment at the 
trial court, or in either of their Opening or Reply Briefs in this Court, cite to a 
single line of testimony in that deposition, or from Harry's criminal trial, to raise 
a purported issue of fact concerning Private Ledger's conduct here. 
4
 As noted at pages 15-16 of Private Ledger's Brief in this matter, the facts 
in Horrocks are completely different from this case because, Inter alia, the agent 
there had used the principal's documentation to obtain the plaintiff's funds, the 
principal had cashed the plaintiff's check, the principal had provided a form which 
the agent used to deceive the plaintiff and the Court of Appeal correctly found issues 
of fact because there was a "record replete with facts sufficient to clothe [the 
agent] with apparent authority." No such evidence existed here. 
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In this case, had plaintiffs presented sworn affidavits or 
depositions indicating that, for example, (1) they made their checks 
for the Red River investment out to Private Ledger, (2) those checks 
had been cashed by Private Ledger, (3) they executed investment forms 
provided by Private Ledger to make the Red River investment, and 
(4) that the Red River investment had appeared on their Private 
Ledger account statements, such evidence may have given rise to 
issues of fact precluding summary judgment. However, as the trial 
court correctly pointed out, and this Court's Decision has 
overlooked, there was absolutely no evidence to that effect presented 
by plaintiffs, as required by Rule 56(e). Indeed, the trial court 
correctly pointed out that the plaintiffs "did, in fact, move from 
different brokerage firms Mr. Harry was employed with" and that 
"Their reliance, in my opinion, was on Mr. Harry and just 
incidentally with the firm he was employed by." [App. B. pp. 4-5] 
V. THIS COURT'S DECISION IGNORES AT LEAST FIVE SEPARATE 
DECISIONS HOLDING, AS A MATTER OF LAW, THAT 
SECURITIES BROKER-DEALERS ARE NOT LIABLE FOR 
UNAUTHORIZED ACTIVITIES OR "SELLING AWAY" ACTIVITIES 
OF THEIR REGISTERED REPRESENTATIVES 
It is undisputed in this action that Harry executed a written 
contract with Private Ledger confirming his independent contractor 
status [R. 523], and confirming various prohibitions and restrictions 
on what Harry could or could not do on behalf of Private Ledger in 
the sale of securities, and executed a separate memo prohibiting 
"selling away." In opposing the summary judgment motion, plaintiffs 
failed to make any showing that they reasonably believed the Red 
River investment had any connection with Private Ledger or had been 
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approved by Private Ledger, but stated only that they were never told 
"that defendant Harry was an independent contractor." [R. 602, 607] 
Private Ledger's Brief [pp. 18-2 8] demonstrated that five 
different decisions, the most recent being Bates v. Shearson Lehman 
Bros., Inc., 42 F.3d 79, 82 (1st Cir. 1994) (copy attached as 
Appendix D), had all concluded, as a matter of law, that a securities 
broker-dealer had no liability to one of its customers who had been 
defrauded by unauthorized activity of its registered representatives. 
This Court's Decision, albeit an unpublished one, is the only 
authority to the contrary, and does not even distinguish or discuss 
in any manner any of those five decisions. 
Of particular significance is Hauser v. Farrell, 14 F.3d 1338 
(9th Cir. 1994) (copy attached as Appendix E), where the Ninth 
Circuit held, as a matter of law, that a securities broker-dealer was 
not liable for the "selling away activities" of its registered 
representatives, including a rejection of any alleged liability for 
ostensible agency. In affirming the summary judgment, the Hauser 
Court concluded: 
Nevertheless, the District Court correctly concluded the 
record left no room for genuine issue of fact, because it 
established that the customers could not reasonably have 
believed that Rauscher/Pierce [the broker-dealer] had 
anything to do with the NTE promotion [the subject 
investment]. [Id. at 1343.] 
The appropriate inquiry for this Court is whether the undisputed 
facts of this case are more closely akin to those in Hauser, Bates 
and the other decisions involving securities broker-dealers, or those 
in Horrocks., where the principal's active involvement, receipt of 
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funds, and the knowledge and use of the principal's forms, was 
readily apparent. This case is completely distinguishable from 
Horrocksf but it is indistinguishable from Hauser and the other cases 
cited by Private Ledger on this issue. Indeed, this Court's Memo 
Decision contradicts its own prior analysis of Private Ledger's rules 
and procedures and the prohibited practice of "selling away," as set 
forth in State v. Harry, 873 P.2d 1149, 1152 (Utah App. 1994), cited 
at page 22 of Private Ledger's Brief. 
VI. THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN CONCLUDING THAT 
HARRY COULD NOT BE PRIVATE LEDGER'S AGENT IN 
CONNECTION WITH CONDUCT WHICH RESULTED IN HIS 
CRIMINAL CONVICTION FOR DEFRAUDING PRIVATE LEDGER 
Again, Private Ledger respectfully submits that this Court 
misconstrues the trial court's comment that "one cannot be an agent 
of the principal at the same time engaging in conduct which is 
criminally fraudulent." Here, unlike many cases involving criminal 
activity of an agent, the purported agent was criminally convicted of 
not only defrauding the customers, but criminally convicted of 
defrauding Private Ledger as well. Given those facts, and no 
evidence from the plaintiffs, the trial court's comment was 
appropriate. As noted in Private Ledger's Brief, if Private Ledger 
had any knowledge or culpability whatsoever, or had in any way 
ratified or condoned such activities by Harry, that knowledge, 
ratification or conduct would have presented a defense to Harry in 
the criminal case, where he was convicted beyond a reasonable doubt 
of having defrauded Private Ledger. Again, it is significant that 
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plaintiffs produced not a single line of testimony from Harry to 
support their claim of apparent agency against Private Ledger. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should not misconstrue a single statement by the 
trial court, which was clearly made in the unique context of this 
case, and thereby conclude that the trial court had misapplied the 
law entirely, warranting a reversal. A full and fair reading of the 
trial court's reasoning, and a review of the overwhelming evidence 
and legal authorities produced by Private Ledger in support of its 
motion, and the complete absence of any admissible evidence from 
plaintiffs showing any wrongful or negligent conduct on the part of 
Private Ledger, supports the trial court's analysis, reasoning and 
ruling. For the foregoing reasons, and as set forth in Private 
Ledger's Brief in this appeal, this Petition For Rehearing should be 
granted. 
DATED: May 16, 1996 Respectfully submitted, 
STRONG & HANNI 
POST KIRBY NOONAN & SWEAT LLP 
By: s J^v?" ^' ^fa 
^S. Baird Mor^anV 
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Third District, Salt Lake County 
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Attorneys: Randy B. Coke and Curtis C. Nesset, Salt Lake City, 
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S. Baird Morgan, Salt Lake City, Michael L. Kirby and 
Jeffrey P. Lendrum, San Diego, California, for 
Appellees 
J. Michael Coombs, Salt Lake City, for Appellee 
Ronald Harry 
Before Judges Orme, Jackson, and Wilkins. 
ORME, Presiding Judge: 
The trial court granted defendants' summary judgment motion, 
concluding that Private Ledger was not liable, as a matter of 
law, for the acts or omissions of defendant Harry. In its order 
denying plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration, the trial court 
explained that }'one cannot be an agent of the principal at the 
same time engaging in conduct which is criminally fraudulent as 
to Private Ledger." However, the trial court cited no authority 
in support of this proposition and we are aware of none. Nor 
have defendants called car attention to any such authority. 
Rather, the general rule is that a principal is liable for 
injuries resulting from the fraua of its agent, committed during 
the existence of the agency and within the scope of the agent's 
actual or apparent authority. See Restatement (Second) of Agency 
§ 161 (1958); Horrocks v. Westfalia Systemat. 892 P.2d 14, 15-16 
(Utah App. 1995), Poulsen v. Treasure State Indus., Inc., 626 
P.2d 822, 829 (Mont. 1981). Moreover, whether an agency 
relationship exists and the scope of the agent's authority are 
questions of fact to be determined by a jury in all but the 
clearest cases. Caraill, Inc. v. Mountain Cement Co.. 891 P.2d 
57, 62 (Wyo. 1995); Mauch v. Kisslina. 783 P.2d 601, 605 (Wash. 
App. 1989). Simply because the agent commits an act that is 
criminal does not automatically shield the principal from all 
responsibility vis-a-vis an innocent third party. 
In this case, the trial court's reasoning that "one cannot 
be an agent of the principal at the same time engaging in conduct 
which is criminally fraudulent," is simply not a correct 
statement of the law. Questions of fact remain as to the 
existence of the agency relationship between Harry and defendants 
and the scope of Harry's authority. 
Nor are we able to sustain the judgment on the alternative 
ground urged by defendants before the trial court, namely that 
plaintiffs' claims are barred by the statute of limitations. 
While traditional application of the discovery rule might suggest 
the claims are time-barred given plaintiffs' concession that they 
knew of some wrongdoing immediately upon receipt of the first 
statement sent by the Bank of Onaga, the result is otherwise 
given the contention that Harry fraudulently concealed his 
misdeeds. See Berenda v. Langford. 2 87 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 
1996). See also State v, Harry, 873 p.2d 1149, 1156 (Utah App. 
1994) (noting that "Harry deceived [plaintiffs] both before and 
after the transaction" in question). 
Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's grant of summary 
judgment in favor of defendants and remand the case for a trial 
on the merits or such other proceedings as may now be 
appropriate. 
G rc go ry E^O rme, ~ 
Presiding Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Michael J. Wilkins, Judge 
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FOR THE PLAINTIFF: 
FOR THE DEFENDANT: 
A P P E A R A N C E S 
RANDY B. COKE 
NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT 
333 North 300 West Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
S. BAIRD MORGAN 
STRONG & HANNI 
9 Exchange Place, 6th Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
and 
MICHAEL L. KIRBY 
POST KIRBY NOONAN & SWEAT 
701 "B" Street, Suite 1400 
San Diego, CA 92101 
ATTORNEY FOR DEPENDANT HARRY: 
JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS 
72 East 400 South, Suite 220 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
COMPUTER-AIDED TRANSCRIPTION 
1 SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; MAY 17, 1994; A.M. SESSION 
2 (REPORTER'S NOTE: The following is an 
3 excerpt of proceedings in the above-entitled case:) 
4 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Kirby. 
5 Dealing with the statute of limitations first, I 
6 think that Mr. Coke has presented an issue of fact 
7 regarding the concealment issue by Mr. Harry and I think 
8 that remains to be an issue of fact in ^ ny mind. 
9 More critically, though, is my analysis as to the 
10 matter of law as to whether or not Private Ledger should 
11 be held liable. I have no argument with Mr. Coke when he 
12 states to me the general proposition regarding respondeat 
13 superior, no controlling person. 
14 The question I have is just how far can that be 
15 reached when the defendant in this matter, Private Ledger, 
16 has gone to what I think is more than sufficient steps to 
17 ensure that activities by their registered agent are 
18 pursuant to their policies. 
19 It is apparent that Red River was not an approved 
20 security from Private Ledgerf that there was no 
21 authorization from Private Ledger to Mr. Harry to go 
22 beyond that policy. In essence, it appears that when a 
23 registered representative of a brokerage firm clearly 
24 violates the firm's policies and engages in unauthorized 
25 activities without the knowledge of Private Ledger in this 
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1 matter, I just cannot see how liability can be imposed 
2 upon the principal, Private Ledger, in this matter. 
3 It did not appear on Private Ledger statements 
4 regarding the purchase of this. There may have been 
5 indication that money was transferred but that was all 
6 that was done and that knowledge was to the plaintiffs in 
7 this matter. 
8 Private Ledger, once again, never approved of the 
9 Red River investment. It did not appear —as I said the 
10 plaintiffs' investments were not run through the Private 
11 Ledger accounts to the extent of appearing on Private 
12 Ledger statements. There had been no fees, no collections 
13 and no prior knowledge of Private Ledger of the activity 
14 of Mr. Harry. 
15 The fact Mr. Harry was criminally convicted of 
16 defrauding Private Ledger crystallizes my opinion in that 
17 one cannot be an agent of the principal at the same time 
18 engaging in conduct which is criminally fraudulent. They 
19 are mutually exclusive actions and terms. 
20 The apparent reliance that Mr. Coke wishes the 
21 court to accept regarding the activities of Messrs. Brgoch 
22 and Isaacs, I do not have to reach the point that they are 
23 sophisticated and/or somehow registered investors by the 
24 fact they have had a long track record with Mr. Harry. 
25 They did, in fact, move from different brokerage firms 
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1 Mr. Harry was employed with. Their reliance, in my 
2 opinion, was on Mr. Harry and just incidentally with the 
3 firm that he was employed by* 
4 I think that in this situation, Private Ledger 
5 has done anything and everything they could to ensure 
6 their registered agents are actually agents of them in 
7 doing what their policies indicate that they are allowed 
8 to do, i.e. trade in approved securities, have commissions 
9 paid pursuant to that, have knowledge of the operations 
10 that the agents are doing in relations to the brokerage 
11 house and the investors, and indicating which ones and 
12 gaining thorough knowledge of activity, then, somehow 
13 ratifying the agent's position in this matter. I find 
14 that has not been done so as a matter of law, I am ruling 
15 for defendant, Private Ledger, regarding their motion for 
16 summary judgment as to the statute of limitations. It 
17 remains to me to be a question of fact to be ferreted out 
18 if, any there be, at trial. 
19 MR. KIRBY: Thank you, your Honor. 
20 THE COURT: With that, Mr. Kirby, Mr. Morgan, 
21 please prepare the appropriate orders in this matter and 
22 submit it to Mr. Coke for his approval prior to submission 
23 to the court for signature. 
24 MR. MORGAN: I will do that, your Honor. 
25 MR. KIRBY: Thank you. 
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1 (REPORTER'S NOTE: Further pretrial 
2 proceedings were had, being reported but not herein 
3 transcribed.) 
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2 
3 STATE OF UTAH ) 
: SS. 
4 County of Salt Lake ) 
5 If Nora S. Worthen, do certify that I am a 
6 Certified Shorthand Reporter and Official Court Reporter 
7 for the Third Judicial District Court, State of Utah; that 
8 as such reporter, I transcribed the proceedings of BRGOCH 
9 AND ISAACS VS. HARRY, ET. AL. , CASE NO. 920901463 CV at 
10 the aforesaid time and place. That the trial proceedings 
11 were reported by me in stenotype using computer-aided, 
12 transcription, consisting of pages 3 through 6 inclusive. 
13 That the same constitutes a true and correct transcription 
14 of said proceedings; 
15 That I am not of kin or otherwise associated with 
16 any of the parties herein or their counsel, and that I am 
17 not interested in the events thereof. 
18 WITNESS my hand at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
19 25th day of May, 1994. 
20 
21 
22 
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BOYNTON IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
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STATE OF CALIFORNIA ) 
) SS: 
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO ) 
Jonathan A. Boynton, being first duly sworn, deposes and 
says: 
1. I am an employee of Linsco/Private Ledger Corporation 
("Private Ledger"), a defendant in the above-captioned matter, 
and have personal knowledge of all the matters contained in this 
affidavit. During the time relevant to this action (November 
1987 through December 1989) my title with Private Ledger was Vice 
President of Legal and Regulatory Affairs. Prior to my 
employment with Private Ledger, I worked as a field investigator, 
and later as a supervisor of examiners, for the National 
Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD"). My present work 
address with Private Ledger is 5871 Oberlin Drive, San Diego, 
California 92121. 
2. Cregg Cannon ("Cannon") became a licensed independent 
contractor registered representative of Private Ledger in 
Salt Lake City, Utah on November 25, 1987. A copy of the 
Representative Agreement executed by Cannon is attached as 
Exhibit 18 to the Memorandum of Points and Authorities ("Memo of 
P&A") filed herewith. 
3. Shortly thereafter, Ronald Allen Harry ("Harry") became 
a licensed independent contractor registered representative of 
Private Ledger in Salt Lake City, Utah on January 11, 1988. A 
copy of the Representative Agreement executed by Harry is 
attached as Exhibit 19 to the Memo of P&A filed herewith. Both 
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Cannon and Harry had previously been with the securities firm of 
Prudential Bache. 
4. As registered representatives of a licensed securities 
broker-dealer (Private Ledger), Cannon and Harry, were 
independent contractors (as confirmed in Section 3 of the 
Representative Agreement) and were only authorized to sell 
approved securities through their registered broker-deal. This 
requirement is referenced in paragraph 1 (A) of the Representative 
Agreement signed by each of them at the time they contracted wi,th 
Private Ledger which states that they were "...to solicit 
purchases of securities and investments offered through Private 
Ledger." [Emphasis added] 
5. In the securities industry, an industry in which I have 
been continuously employed for more than 15 years, the 
unauthorized activity of a registered representative selling 
securities which have not been approved by the broker-deal firm 
is known as "selling away" from the firm. To emphasize that its 
representatives were strictly prohibited from engaging in any 
selling away activities, Private Ledger made it a practice to so 
advise its representatives, and in fact Private Ledger also had a 
written form which it required its registered representatives to 
sign to acknowledge their awareness of Private Ledger's (and the 
NASD's) prohibition against "selling away." 
6. At the time Cannon and Harry joined Private Ledger, 
Cannon and Harry each signed a memorandum acknowledging the 
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prohibition against the solicitation and sale of private 
securities transactions which were not approved by Private 
Ledger. Attached as Exhibits 12 and 13 to the Memo of P&A in 
support of motion for summary judgment, are true and correct 
copies of said memoranda signed by Cannon and Harry. As set 
forth in that memorandum, the Private Ledger representatives, 
including Harry, were specifically reminded: 
Participation by a registered representative in 
a private securities transaction requires written 
notification to and written approval by Private 
Ledger, regardless of whether or not there is any 
compensation involved in the transaction. 
7. Red River Mountain Limited Partnership ("Red River") 
was never approved for sale by Private Ledger. In order for a 
security to be approved for sale by Private Ledger, it was 
necessary for the security to be reviewed by the Private Ledger 
due diligence committee, and if approved, the name of that 
security would then be included on a list of approved securities 
distributed to Private Ledger representatives. Red River never 
appeared on any list of securities approved for sale through 
Private Ledger representatives. 
8. Private Ledger first learned of Cannon's involvement 
with Red River when Private Ledger received a letter from 
Scott R. Frost of the State of Utah, Department of Business 
Regulations, Securities Division, dated February 3, 1989. 
Attached as Exhibit 14 to the Memo of P&A is a true and correct 
copy of said letter. Thereafter, Private Ledger promptly 
conducted its own investigation and terminated its relationship 
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with Cannon on March 8, 1989. Attached as Exhibit 15 to the Memo 
of P&A is a true and correct copy of NASD Form U-5, dated 
March 22, 1989, which confirms the termination of Private 
Ledger's registered representative relationship with Cannon. 
9. Private Ledger subsequently learned that Red River was 
an Arizona real estate limited partnership and that the general 
partners were Cannon and Ross N. Farnsworth, Jr. The Court will 
note that the written Pre-Offering Summary [Exhibit 7 to the Memo 
of P&A] does not once mention or refer to Private Ledger. 
10. Private Ledger did not become aware of Harry's 
involvement with Red River until November 7, 1989. Thereafter, 
Private Ledger terminated its relationship with Harry on 
November 15, 1989. Attached as Exhibit 16 to the Memo of P&A is 
a letter from Private Ledger to Harry, dated November 15, 1989, 
informing Harry of his termination for cause effective 
immediately. In addition, attached as Exhibit 17 to the Memo P&A 
are the NASD Form U-5s, dated November 22, 198 9 and January 11, 
1990, confirming the termination of Harry's registered 
representative status with Private Ledger. 
11. Plaintiffs' investments in Red River were not made 
through Private Ledger and the Red River investments never 
appeared on any Private Ledger statements. Private Ledger had no 
prior knowledge that Harry had solicited plaintiffs to invest in 
Red River and Private Ledger received no commissions or fees 
whatsoever on such investments. Harry's activities regarding Red 
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River were improper and unauthorized selling away activities, 
which were never approved by Private Ledger. 
12. Following their termination by Private Ledger, both 
Cannon (through a guilty plea) and Harry (following trial) were 
convicted of committing criminal fraud on Private Ledger in 
connection with their unauthorized solicitation and sale of 
investments in Red River. 
13. In engaging in criminal fraud on Private Ledger, Harry 
was acting beyond the course and scope of any authority he had as 
a registered representative of Private Ledger. By engaging in, 
selling away activities, after having agreed in writing never to 
do so, Harry violated the terms of his Representative Agreement 
with Private Ledger and was not acting in the course and scope of 
his duties as an independent contractor registered representative 
of Private Ledger. 
Further Affiant saith not. 
DATED this <W day of March, 1994 
Jonathan A. Bovnton 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this <Q9 day of March, 1994. 
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ADDENDUM D: 
BATES V. SHEARSON LEHMAN BROS., INC., 12 F.3d 79 (1st Cir. 1«»«M». 
BATES v. SHEARSON LEHMAN BROS., INC. 79 
Cite as 42 F.3d 79 (1st Or. 1994) 
ed to investor that her funds would be invest-
ed with firm. Dorothy BATES, through her Guardian, 
Barbara MURPHY, Plaintiff-
Appellant, 
v. 
SHEARSON LEHMAN BROTHERS, 
INC., Defendant-Appellee. 
No. 94-1300. 
United States Court of Appeals, 
First Circuit. 
Heard Sept. 12, 1994. 
Decided Dec. 16, 1994. 
Investor brought suit seeking to hold 
brokerage firm liable for acts of broker who 
misappropriated investor's funds. The Unit-
ed States District Court for the District of 
Rhode Island, Francis J. Boyle, J., granted 
summary judgment for firm, and investor 
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Torruella, 
Chief Judge, held that: (1) firm was not 
liable under theory of apparent authority, 
and (2) trial court did not err in excluding 
testimony proffered by investor. 
Affirmed. 
1. Principal and Agent <s=>99 
Under Rhode Island law, agency may be 
based upon apparent authority. 
2. Principal and Agent <S=>101(1) 
Under Rhode Island law, apparent au-
thority arises from principal's manifestation 
of such authority to party with whom agent 
contracts; additionally, third party's belief in 
agent's authority to act on behalf of principal 
must be reasonable. 
3. Brokers <S=>35 
Under Rhode Island law, brokerage firm 
which employed broker during time he mis-
appropriated investor's funds was not liable 
for broker's actions under theory of apparent 
authority, where firm's policy required bro-
kers to open customer account before invest-
ing client's money, and broker never opened 
up account for investor at firm, never depos-
ited any of investor's funds with firm and 
never expressly told or otherwise represent-
4. Brokers <®=>38(4) 
In action whereby investor sought to 
hold brokerage firm liable for broker's mis-
appropriation of investor's funds under theo-
ry of apparent authority, broker's testimony 
regarding' funds he received from another 
client was irrelevant, where alleged diversion 
of other client's funds occurred before broker 
was employed by firm and other client was 
not client of firm. 
5. Federal Civil Procedure ^2011 
In action whereby investor sought to 
hold brokerage firm liable for broker's mis-
appropriation of investor's funds under theo-
ry of apparent authority, trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in excluding, as cumula-
tive and marginally relevant, witness' testi-
mony that broker had told witness that part 
of the funds he had obtained from investor 
were for personal use and part of the funds 
was for investment. 
6. Federal Courts <S=>901.1 
Any error in trial court's exclusion of 
testimony proffered by investor was harm-
less, since testimony would not have estab-
lished that broker had apparent authority to 
act for brokerage firm. 
Quentin Anthony, with whom Sheffield & 
Harvey, Newport, RI, was on brief, for ap-
pellant. 
David A. Wollin, with whom Paul V. Cur-
cio, Christopher C. Whitney, and Adler Pol-
lock & Sheehan Inc., Providence, RI, were on 
brief, for appellee. 
Before TORRUELLA, Chief Judge, 
CAMPBELL, Senior Circuit Judge, and 
STAHL, Circuit Judge. 
TORRUELLA, Chief Judge. 
Dorothy Bates, through her guardian Bar-
bara Murphy ("Bates"), brought an action 
against Shearson Lehman Brothers, Inc. 
("Shearson"), Bates claimed that Shearson 
was liable for the acts of its alleged agent, 
Carl P. Nykaza, a broker at Shearson, who 
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diverted approximately $70,000 of Bates' 
funds, for his own personal account. A trial 
commenced, and at the conclusion of Bates' 
case, Shearson moved for judgment as a 
matter of law. The court granted Shearson's 
motion, finding that Bates had failed to pres-
ent sufficient evidence to support her theory 
that Shearson should be held liable for Nyka-
za's actions under the theory of apparent 
authority. Bates now appeals. Although 
Bates was the victim of a tremendous inequi-
ty and we sympathize with her situation, we 
do not believe that liability can be attributed 
to Shearson. Therefore, for the following 
reasons, we affirm. 
I. BACKGROUND 
In reviewing the court's decision to grant 
Shearson's motion for judgment as a matter 
of law, we consider the evidence in the light 
most favorable to Bates, the nonmoving par-
ty. Jordan-Milton Machinery, Inc. v. F/V 
Teresa Marie, II, 978 F.2d 32, 34 (1st Cir. 
1992). 
At the time of trial, Bates was an 82-year-
old woman. In 1991, Bates entered a nurs-
ing home in Providence, Rhode Island. 
Bates is mentally incompetent and unable to 
describe the events and transactions which 
form the basis of this lawsuit. 
Nykaza began working in the securities 
industry as a broker for E.F. Hutton in 1984. 
E.F. Hutton assigned Nykaza to Bates' ac-
count in 1985, at which time Nykaza met with 
Bates at her home in Providence to discuss 
the status of her accounts and to solicit mon-
ey for investment. 
Nykaza left E.F. Hutton in 1988 and began 
working for Thomson McKinnon Securities, 
Inc. ("Thomson"). Nykaza transferred 
Bates' account, as well as fifteen or twenty 
other accounts, from E.F. Hutton to Thom-
son at that time. While at Thomson, Nykaza 
continued to manage Bates' account and 
would visit her at her home two or three 
times a month. 
In the spring of 1989, Nykaza closed 
Bates' account at Thomson. Nykaza's em-
ployment with Thomson also ceased. At this 
time, Nykaza was attempting to secure a 
broker position at Shearson in Westport, 
Connecticut. Shearson hired Nykaza as a 
broker sometime in June or July, 1989. 
Shearson policy required brokers to open an 
account for a customer before a broker could 
invest any of that customer's money. A 
branch manager then had to approve all new 
accounts. Nykaza transferred approximately 
twelve accounts from Thomson to Shearson, 
but he never opened an account for Bates at 
Shearson. 
On June 13, 1989, Nykaza went to Bates' 
home to obtain money. Nykaza prepared a 
check from her account at Fleet National 
Bank ("Fleet") in the amount of $25,000, 
payable to Rhode Island Hospital Trust Na-
tional Bank ("Hospital Trust"), and had 
Bates sign it. Nykaza then deposited the 
check into his personal account at Hospital 
Trust, without endorsement. 
On August 3, 1989, Nykaza went to Bates' 
home and prepared a second check from 
Bates' account at Fleet in the amount of 
$20,000, made it payable to Hospital Trust, 
and had Bates sign the check. Nykaza then 
deposited the check into his personal account 
at Hospital Trust. 
On January 9, 1990, Nykaza again went to 
Bates' home, prepared a third check from 
Bates' account at Fleet in the amount of 
$25,000, and made it payable to Hospital 
Trust. After Bates signed the check, Nyka-
za deposited it in his personal account at 
Hospital Trust. 
Nykaza's employment with Shearson encP 
ed on February 16, 1990. During Nykaza's 
employment with Shearson, no one atSheai* 
son was aware that Nykaza was receiving 
money from Bates. Nykaza never deposited 
at Shearson the funds he received fron[ 
Bates. Nykaza also never told Bates, of 
otherwise represented, that he was going m 
deposit the funds reflected by her checks m 
Shearson. Nykaza used all the funds p « 
tained from Bates for his own personal bene! 
fit. 
After leaving Shearson, Nykaza beglB 
working for Dominick and Dominick, W | 
("Dominick") as a broker. Nykaza continuafl 
to prepare checks from Bates' accountiS 
Fleet for her signature and deposit themMg 
his personal account at Hospital Trawl 
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These checks, prepared after he left Shear-
son, totalled $95,000. 
On June 12, 1990, Nykaza set up an ac-
count at Dominick in the name of "D.M. 
Bates." Nykaza listed Bates' social security 
number, but all of the other information on 
the account was false. Nykaza signed Bates' 
name to the new account form and all other 
required documentation. Nykaza then in-
vested approximately $5,000 from money he 
had previously obtained from Bates. His 
stated purpose in opening the account was to 
try to make some money through trading in 
order to repay Bates. 
After Bates discovered Nykaza's diversion 
of her funds, she brought this lawsuit against 
Nykaza and Shearson to recover the $70,000 
allegedly lost during Nykaza's employment 
with Shearson. Nykaza subsequently al-
lowed judgment to be entered against him in 
the sum of $70,000. Bates then proceeded to 
trial with her suit against Shearson, claiming 
that it was liable for the acts of its agent 
Nykaza. After Bates concluded presenting 
her case at trial, Shearson moved for judg-
ment as a matter of law. The court granted 
its motion. Bates then moved for a new 
trial, and the court denied her motion. 
Bates now appeals. 
II. ANALYSIS 
A. The Court's Judgment 
as a Matter of Law 
In granting Shearson's motion for judg-
ment as a matter of law, the court found that 
Shearson's liability hinged upon whether Ny-
kaza acted as an agent of Shearson. After 
concluding that there was no evidence that 
there was an actual agency, the court deter-
mined that the issue was whether Nykaza 
had apparent authority from Shearson. The 
court stated: 
That essentially there are two prongs to a 
determination as to whether or not a prin-
cipal is liable for the acts of its agents or 
employees in these circumstances, that is, 
that there must be some kind of manifesta-
tion to the third party from the principal 
that the agent or employee is acting in the 
1. On appeal, Bates does not challenge the district 
court's ruling that Nykaza lacked actual authon-
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scope or in the course of employment or 
agency. Certainly there must be some 
basis which one might believe that indeed 
this was so. So that there are two prongs 
here, (1) a manifestation by the principal, 
and (2) a reliance to some extent by the 
third party dealing with the agent or em-
ployee. 
I must consider the evidence at this 
point in the point of view most favorable to 
the Plaintiff. However, having said that 
the evidence it seems to me is totally lack-
ing of any manifestation by Shearson Leh-
man to the putative investor that Mr. My-
kaza [sic] was acting as its agent or em-
ployee in receiving funds. Furthermore, 
there is no evidence at all, even from the 
point of view of viewing the evidence most 
favorable to the Plaintiff, of any basis, 
reasonable or otherwise, for a belief that 
this was indeed what was happening. 
The checks were drawn to Rhode Island 
Hospital Trust Company. We might have 
a different situation if they had been 
drawn to Shearson Lehman but any deal-
ings that were had here were with Mr. 
Mykaza [sic] and Hospital Trust and the 
third party. It seems to me given those 
circumstances I have no choice but to 
grant the Defendant's motion for judgment 
as a matter of law and it is granted. 
Bates took exception to this ruling. On ap-
peal, she now claims that the court erred, 
and that the evidence was sufficient to per-
mit the jury to reasonably conclude that Ny-
kaza did have "apparent authority" to act as 
an agent of Shearson.1 
As a preliminary matter, we set forth the 
appropriate standard of review. Appellate 
review of a motion for a judgment as a 
matter of law is de novo. Jordan-Milton 
Machinery, 978 F.2d at 34. When a motion 
for a judgment as a matter of law has been 
granted, we review the evidence and the 
inferences reasonably drawn therefrom, in 
the light most favorable to the nonmoving 
party. Id; Fashion House, Inc. v. K Mart 
Corp., 892 F.2d 1076,1088 (1st Cir.1989). To 
affirm, we must find that the evidence led to 
ty to act as an agent of Shearson in his dealings 
with Bates. 
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only one reasonable conclusion Jordan-
Milton Machinery 978 F 2d at 34, Fashion 
House, Inc, 892 F2d at 1088, see Commer 
cial Assocs v Tilcon Gammino, Inc, 998 
F 2d 1092, 1099 (1st Cir 1993) In perform 
mg this analysis, we will not make credibility 
determinations or evaluate the weight of the 
evidence Jordan-Milton Machinery, 978 
F 2d at 34, Fashion House, Inc, 892 F 2d at 
1088 "Nevertheless, the evidence to which 
the nonmovant points must comprise more 
than fragmentary tendrils a mere scintilla 
of evidence is not enough to forestall [judg 
ment as a matter of law], especially on a 
claim or issue as to which the burden of 
proof belongs to the objecting party " Fash 
ion House, Inc, 892 F 2d at 1088 (citations 
omitted) 
[1,2] Under Rhode Island law, agenc\ 
may be based upon apparent authority2 
Commercial Assocs, 998 F 2d at 1099 
"To establish the apparent authority of an 
agent to do a certain act, facts must be 
shown that the principal has manifestly 
consented to the exercise of such authority 
or has knowingly permitted the agent to 
assume the exercise of such authority, 
that a third person knew of the fact and, 
acting in good faith had reason to believe 
and did actually believe that the agent 
possessed such authority; and that the 
third person, relying on such appearance 
of authority, has changed his position and 
will be injured or suffer loss if the act done 
or transaction executed by the agent does 
not bmd the principal" 
American Title Ins Co v East West Finan 
cud Corp, 16 F3d 449, 454 (1st Cir 1994) 
(quoting Calenda v Allstate Ins Co, 518 
A^d 624, 628 (R11986)) (other citations 
omitted) Apparent authority arises from 
the principal's manifestation of such authori-
ty to the party with whom the agent con-
tracts Commercial Assocs, 998 F2d at 
1099 (citing Menard & Co. Masonry Bldg 
Contractors v Marshall Bldg Systems Inc, 
539 A 2d 523, 526 (RJ.1988)). The focus is 
therefore on the conduct of the principal, and 
not on the putative agent. Commercial As 
socs, 998 F 2d at 1099. Additionally, a third 
party's belief m the agent's authority to act 
on behalf of the principal must be a reason-
able one Id (citing Rodngues v Miriam 
Hospital, 623 A2d 456 (R 11993)) 
[3] In the present case, there is simply 
no evidence of anv representation or conduct 
by Shearson that would suggest to Bates that 
Nykaza had authority to act for it When 
Nykaza commenced working at Shearson, 
Nykaza never opened up an account for 
Bates at Shearson Thereafter, when Nyka-
za would go to Bates' home, and prepare 
checks for Bates to sign, he never had her 
issue them to Shearson Rather the checks 
were made out to Hospital Trust Nykaza 
nevei deposited any of Bates' funds with 
Shearson Additionally, Nykaza never ex-
pressly told or otherwise represented to 
Bates that her funds would be invested with 
Shearson 
Shearson did not give Nvkaza any authori-
ty to solicit money from Bates in such a 
fashion Shearson policy in no way counte-
nanced Nykaza's actions Rather, its policy 
required brokers to open a customer account 
before investing a client's money A Shear-
son branch manager then had to approve any 
new account Furthermore, Shearson re-
quired that all money placed into an account 
for investment purposes be made payable to 
Shearson Moreover, Shearson had no way 
to know of Nykaza's dealings with Bates— 
Nykaza never opened an account at Shearson 
for Bates, and all of his dealings with her 
took place at her home 
Even if Bates m fact believed that Nykaza 
lepresented Shearson, no reasonable jury 
could have found that belief justifiable A 
generous reading of the evidence would sug-
gest that Bates gave Nykaza money to invest 
for her, and while Nykaza was working at 
Shearson, Bates learned, "at one point," that 
he was working there Based on this read-
ing, Bates contends that by virtue of Shear-
son hiring Nykaza to work as a broker for it, 
she assumed that the money she gave Nyka-
za would be invested at Shearson. See Re-
statement (Second) of Agency, § 261 A 
third party's belief m an agent's authority to 
act on behalf of a principal, however, must be 
reasonable* Commercial Assocs, 998 F2d 
2 The parties both agree that Rhode Island law controls this diversity action 
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at 1099; see American Soc. of Mechanical 
Engineers, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corjx. 456 U.S. 
556, 566, 102 S.Ct. 1935, 1942, 72 L.Ed.2d 330 
(1982) (citing Restatement (Second) of Agen-
cy § 261 and explaining that under an appar-
ent authority theory, liability can be based 
upon the fact that the agent's position facili-
tates the consummation of the fraud, where 
from the point of view of the third person, 
the transaction seems regular on its face and 
the agent appears to be acting in the ordi-
nary course of the business confided to him). 
Here, the reasonableness of Bates' conten-
tion is undermined by the fact that the al-
leged investments with Shearson did not ap-
pear regular on their face—Nykaza never 
told her that he was investing her money at 
Shearson, Bates never filled out an applica-
tion to open an account at Shearson, and the 
checks she gave Nykaza were not made out 
to Shearson. See Veranda Beach Club Ltd. 
Partnership v. Western Surety Co., 936 F.2d 
1364, 1378 (1st Cir.1991) (when applying 
analogous Massachusetts law, court found 
that plaintiffs knowledge that employee was 
officer of company did not create a reason-
able belief that employee had apparent au-
thority to act for employer). There is simply 
no evidentiary basis from which to reason-
ably conclude that Nykaza had apparent au-
thority to act as an agent of Shearson in his 
dealings with Bates. 
B. The Evidentiary Rulings 
Bates claims that the district court erred 
in excluding certain testimony. Before we 
analyze the substance of these claims, we set 
forth the standard of review and certain evi-
dentiary principles. The admission and ex-
clusion of evidence is primarily committed to 
the discretion of the trial court, and we will 
not disturb this determination absent a show-
ing of an abuse of discretion. Doty v. SewaU, 
908 F.2d 1053,1058 (1st Cir.1990). In gener-
*lt "[alU relevant evidence is admissible" and 
lejvidence which is not relevant is not ad-
missible." Fed.R.Evid. 402. A trial court 
^ appreciable flexibility in admitting or 
deluding evidence on relevancy grounds. 
•wmcfa Beach Club, 936 F.2d at 1373. Evi-
<*»<* is "relevant" if it has "any tendency to 
**•<* the existence of any fact that is of 
°*sequence to the determination of the ac-
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tion more probable or less probable than it 
would be without the evidence." Fed. 
R.Evid. 401. 
1. The Proffered Testimony 
Regarding Justin Grace 
[4] Bates claims that the court erred by 
excluding testimony from Nykaza regarding 
funds he had received from Justin Grace. To 
support this contention, Bates argues that 
Nykaza testified that the first check he re-
ceived from Bates was a loan in anticipation 
of his move to Connecticut and his temporary 
unemployment. To rebut the credibility of 
this testimony, Bates offered to prove that 
one month prior to Nykaza's solicitation of 
Bates for a loan, Nykaza had deposited into 
his own account a check in the amount of 
$21,000 from another client, Justin Grace, 
and that these funds were still available to 
Nykaza on June 13th. Therefore, Bates ar-
gues that because Nykaza did not need a 
loan from Bates on June 13, 1983, he had 
other purposes for her check, such as invest-
ment. 
The court excluded this testimony because 
it determined that the evidence was irrele-
vant. We do not believe that the court 
abused its discretion in so finding. The cen-
tral issue in this case was whether or not 
Nykaza had apparent authority from Shear-
son in his dealings with Bates. As we have 
previously stated, the focus in determining 
whether an agent has apparent authority 
from its principal is not on the conduct of the 
putative agent, but rather on the conduct of 
the principal. Commercial Assocs., 998 F.2d 
at 1099. Nykaza's testimony regarding 
Grace in no way related to conduct by Shear-
son. Nykaza's alleged diversion of Grace's 
funds occurred before he was employed by 
Shearson. Additionally, Grace was not a 
Shearson client. Moreover, Bates' overly 
speculative argument fails to have any ten-
dency to show that Nykaza somehow had 
apparent authority to act on behalf of Shear-
son. 
2. The Proffered Testimony 
of William Harvey 
[5] Bates claims that the court erred in 
excluding the testimony of William Harvey, 
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who had two telephone conversations with 
Nykaza in July 1991, over a year after Nyka-
za left Shearson. Harvey's testimony, if al-
lowed, was to the effect that Nykaza had told 
him that part of the funds he had obtained 
from Bates were for personal use and part of 
the funds were for investment. Harvey's 
testimony also would have shown that Nyka-
za told him that the purpose of the Domimck 
account he subsequently opened with $5,000 
was to regain the monies he had previously 
taken from Bates. Bates argues that this 
evidence was necessary to prove that Nykaza 
obtained the funds from Bates for investment 
purposes, presumably at Shearson. 
The court excluded this testimony because 
it did not believe that Harvey's testimony 
added anything to assist the jury with re-
spect to the issue of whether Nykaza was 
acting as an a^ent of Shearson in his dealings 
with Bates. We do not believe that the court 
abused its discretion in excluding the evi-
dence because it was cumulative and only 
marginally relevant at best. 
The issue in this case was whether or not 
Shearson had engaged in any conduct that 
gave Nykaza apparent authority to act as its 
agent in his dealings with Bates. None of 
Harvey's proposed testimony was to the ef-
fect that Nykaza was going to invest Bates' 
money at Shearson. In fact, Harvey's prof-
fer indicated that Nykaza never mentioned 
Shearson at all to him. 
[6] As a final matter, we note that even if 
we were to find error in the court's two 
evidentiary decisions, which we do not, we 
would be bound to hold the error harmless 
on this record. Even if this evidence had 
been admitted, none of the testimony was 
sufficient to establish that Shearson engaged 
in any conduct that gave Nykaza apparent 
authority to act as its agent in his dealings 
with Bates. 
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of 
the district court is affirmed. 
(o | KEY NUMBER SYSTEM > 
UNITED STATES AVIATION 
UNDERWRITERS, INC., 
Plaintiff, Appellee, 
v. 
FITCHBURG-LEOMINSTER, FLYING 
CLUB, INC., et al., Defendants, 
Appellees, 
and 
Deborah G. Crocker, Defendant, 
Appellant. 
No. 94^1644. 
United States Court of Appeals, 
First Circuit. 
Heard Sept. 15, 1994. 
Decided Dec.Ad, 1994. 
Aviation liability insurer brought diversi-
ty action seeking determination that accident 
Victim was "passenger" within meaning oi 
policy, even though she was outside of air-
craft at time of injury. The United States 
district Court for the District of Massachu-
setts, Nathaniel M. Gorton, J., entered sum-
mary judgment for insurer, and accident vic-
tim appealed. The Court of Appeals, Coffin, 
Senior Circuit Judge, held that accident vic-
tim who was injured when she walked into 
plane's propeller upon exiting airplane to 
Seek help in parking it was passenger" who 
Was subject to $100,000 cap on liability cover-
age for passengers in aviation liability policy. 
Affirmed. 
\. Insurance <&=>146.1(1, 2) 
Both to probe fair and reasonable mean-
ing and to test for ambiguity, court examines 
Actual language of insurance policy used, con^  
text, parties, reasonable expectations, and 
Relevant cases. 
%. Insurance @=>435.37 
Under Massachusetts law, accident vie* 
tim who was injured when she walked into 
Mane's propeller upon exiting airplane- ttf 
^eek help in parking it was "passenger" wb0! 
ADDENDUM E: 
HAUSER v. FARRELL, 14 F.3d 1338 (9th Cir. 1994). 
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Willis V. HAUSER, Rafael Acosta, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
v. 
John FARRELL, Alvin Harvey, Rauscher, 
Pierce, Refsnes, Inc., a California Cor-
poration, Janice Industries, Inc., d/b/a 
Janmar Lighting, a California Corpora-
tion, Truman Aubrey, Defendants-Ap-
pellees. 
No. 91-16400. 
United States Court of Appeals, 
Ninth Circuit 
Argued and Submitted Dec. 16, 1992. 
Decided Jan. 14, 1994. 
Investors brought securities fraud action 
against stockbrokers and brokerage firm. 
The United States District Court for the 
District of Nevada, Lloyd D. George, Chief 
Judge, granted summary judgment for firm, 
and investors appealed. The Court of Ap-
peals, Kleinfeld, Circuit Judge, held that: (1) 
firm was not liable as "controlling person" 
under Securities Exchange Act in relation to 
stockbrokers' promotion of investment; (2) 
firm was not liable as aider and abettor of 
stockbrokers' alleged misrepresentations to 
investors; (3) firm was not vicariously liable 
for stockbrokers' alleged misrepresentations 
under Nevada law doctrine of respondeat 
superior; and (4) investors' counsel's ob-
structive refusal to make reasonable accom-
modation for firm's counsel in setting deposi-
tion dates warranted protective order and 
award of $1,600 in attorney fees. 
Affirmed. 
1. Federal Civil Procedure <3»2553 
District court did not abuse its discre-
tion in denying continuance of summary 
judgment proceeding for purpose of allowing 
plaintiffs to take deposition, where plaintiffs 
offered no reason why they did not depose 
that person during 27 months from date that 
lawsuit was filed to close of discovery. Fed. 
Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 56(f), 28 U.S.C.A. 
2. Federal Courts <B»776 
Court of Appeals reviews grant of sum-
mary judgment de novo, determining wheth-
er, viewing evidence in light most favorable 
to nonmoving party, there are any genuine 
issues of material fact and whether district 
court correctly applied relevant substantive 
law. 
3. Securities Regulation <3=*60.40 
Securities brokerage firm did not qualify 
as "controlling person" in relation to stock-
brokers' promotion of investments in part-
nership, and, thus, firm did not have control-
ling person liability for stockbrokers' alleged 
misrepresentations to investors; investors 
placed their money with stockbrokers for 
purposes other than investment in markets 
to which stockbrokers had access only by 
reason of their relationship with firm, invest-
ment scheme was stockbrokers' own personal 
project in which they held personal interests, 
firm had no knowledge of or financial inter-
est in venture, and there was no evidence 
that investors relied on stockbrokers' associ-
ation with firm in their investment decisions. 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 20(a), 15 
U.S.C.A. § 78«a). 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and def-
initions. 
4. Securities Regulation @»60.41 
To be liable as aider and abettor under 
section of Securities Exchange Act, proof of 
three things is required: existence of inde-
pendent primary wrong; actual knowledge 
by alleged aider and abettor of wrong and of 
his or her role in furthering it; and substan-
tial assistance in the wrong. Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C.A. 
§ 78j(b). 
5. Securities Regulation <3=>60.41, 60.45(2) 
Securities brokerage firm was not liable 
as aider and abettor for stockbrokers' alleged 
misrepresentations about investments, even 
though stockbrokers were denoted as vice 
presidents by firm, where there was no evi-
dence of wrong, scienter, or assistance in 
wrong by anyone other than stockbrokers 
themselves. Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, § 10(b), 15 U.S.CA. § 78j(b). 
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6. Securities Regulation <s=»35.16 
Aider and abettor liability under Securi-
ties Exchange Act is means of holding re-
sponsible someone other than wrongdoer 
who, knowing of independent wrong and his 
or her role in furthering it, substantially 
assists in the wrong. Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j(b). 
7. Securities Regulation <3=»35.16 
Concept of aider and abettor liability 
under Securities Exchange Act cannot be 
applied through legal fiction to entity which 
does not know of wrong or its role if any in 
furthering it. Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j(b). 
8. Securities Regulation <3»60.42 
Securities brokerage firm was not vicari-
ously liable pursuant to Nevada law doctrine 
of respondeat superior for stockbrokers' al-
leged misrepresentations about investments 
in partnership, even though stockbrokers 
were firm's employees, where investors could 
not have reasonably believed that firm had 
anything to do with promotion of invest-
ments; investors placed their money with 
stockbrokers for purposes other than invest-
ment in markets to which stockbrokers had 
access only by reason of their relationship 
with firm, and investment scheme was stock-
brokers' own personal project in which they 
held personal interests. 
9. Federal Civil Procedure <3=»2774(4) 
Securities brokerage firm's motion for 
disqualification of investors' attorney in secu-
rities fraud action, based on investors' attor-
ney's interview of stockbroker without first 
notifying firm, was by no means frivolous, 
legally unreasonable, without legal founda-
tion, or brought for any improper purpose, 
and, thus, Rule 11 sanctions would not be 
imposed against firm following denial of mo-
tion, where question of disqualification was 
close one. Fe&Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 11, 28 
U.S.C.A.; Nev. Sup.CtRules, Rule 182. 
10. Federal Courts <3>870 
Court of Appeals would review for clear 
error a magistrate judge's granting of defen-
dant's motion for protective order, and order-
ing that plaintiffs pay $1,600 to defendant as 
reasonable expenses including attorney fees 
of seeking protective order. Fed.Rules Civ. 
Proc.Rule 26(c), 28 U.S.C.A. 
11. Federal Civil Procedure <3=>1359, 1366 
Investors' obstructive refusal to make 
reasonable accommodation for securities bro-
kerage firm's attorney's schedule in setting 
deposition dates warranted protective order 
and requirement that investors pay $1,600 to 
firm as reasonable expenses including attor-
ney fees of seeking protective order; firm's 
counsel had requested change in dates be-
cause first date was legal holiday and counsel 
had trial beginning on second date, and 
firm's counsel had offered numerous alterna-
tive dates. FedRules Civ.Proc.Rule 26(c), 28 
U.S.C.A. 
Richard McKnight, Las Vegas, NV, for 
plaintiffs-appellants. 
Rodney M. Jean, Evan J. Wallach, Lionel 
Sawyer & Collins, Las Vegas, NV, for defen-
dant-appellee Rauscher, Pierce, Refsnes, Inc. 
Appeal from the United States District 
Court for the District of Nevada. 
Before: NORRIS, BEEZER and 
KLEINFELD, Circuit Judges. 
KLEINFELD, Circuit Judge: 
Appellants Hauser and Acosta invested in 
a business venture with two stockbrokers at 
Rauscher, Pierce, a securities brokerage 
firm. The venture failed. The appellants 
sued the stockbrokers and the firm, and ob-
tained a judgment against the stockbrokers 
based on fraud. The appellants proposed 
several theories of vicarious liability to hold 
the brokerage firm liable, but the district 
court granted summary judgment in favor of 
the firm on the ground that the business 
venture was outside Rauscher, Pierce's con-
trol. We affirm. 
I. Facts. 
The undisputed facts establish the follow-
ing. The stockbrokers, John Farrell and 
Alvin Harvey, worked for Rauscher, Pierce 
between October 1986 and November 1987. 
They sold the appellants interests in a part-
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nership, intended to be incorporated, called 
New Technologies in Energy (NTE), which 
was promoted as a provider of energy effi-
cient lighting to hotels and casinos. Some of 
the conversations in which the stockbrokers 
promoted the business to the customers, and 
the exchange of the customers' money for the 
agreements to sell them interests in NTE, 
took place at Rauscher, Pierce. NTE was 
not a Rauscher, Pierce promotion. The two 
stockbrokers owned it themselves. No one 
at the firm except the two stockbrokers 
themselves knew the brokers were selling 
interests in NTE. Although their supervisor 
reviewed their orders daily, the NTE invest-
ment did not pass through that process. The 
broker who sold the NTE investment to Mr. 
Hauser, John Harvey, testified at his deposi-
tion that he considered it a private transac-
tion having nothing to do with Rauscher, 
Pierce and he did not report it to Rauscher, 
Pierce. 
The stockbrokers testified at their deposi-
tions that they told Mr. Hauser and Mr. 
Acosta several times that the NTE invest-
ment had nothing to do with Rauscher, 
Pierce, and Rauscher, Pierce had nothing to 
do with the transactions. The NTE transac-
tions were not listed on the statements Mr. 
Hauser and Mr. Acosta received from 
Rauscher, Pierce or the previous firms the 
stockbrokers had worked for when they pre-
viously sold the appellants NTE interests. 
Both customers were sophisticated, experi-
enced investors. Mr. Hauser first learned of 
NTE in 1984, and began investing money in 
it in February 1986, some months before the 
stockbrokers went to work for Rauscher, 
Pierce. After the brokers began working for 
Rauscher, Pierce, they continued to promote 
NTE to Mr. Hauser, and he invested more 
money in October 1987. For a while, Mr. 
Hauser would meet one or both of the stock-
brokers at the Rauscher, Pierce office about 
twice a week, and they would go to lunch 
together. The October 1987 sale was con-
cluded at the Rauscher, Pierce office, with 
the two stockbrokers and a secretary pres-
ent Mr. Hauser acknowledged at his depo-
sition that when he first invested in NTE, he 
understood that it was a side deal unconnect-
ed with his trading activities through the 
brokerage firm for which they then worked. 
He never received anything on Rauscher, 
Pierce stationery encouraging him to invest 
in NTE. He did not recall any discussion of 
whether Rauscher, Pierce had any interest in 
NTE, but he "presumed" the firm was in-
volved. 
Mr. Acosta testified at his deposition that 
he too became acquainted with the two stock-
brokers before they went to work for 
Rauscher, Pierce, although he did not invest 
in NTE until the summer of 1987, when the 
stockbrokers were working for the firm. He, 
like Mr. Hauser, understood from the stock-
brokers that they were planning to quit 
working for Rauscher, Pierce and go to work 
full-time in the lighting company they were 
creating, NTE. His conversations with the 
brokers about NTE took place at their 
Rauscher, Pierce office. Although the stock-
brokers' supervisor walked into the office at 
least once while they were discussing NTE, 
Mr. Acosta did not recall what they said that 
the supervisor might have overheard, and did 
not know if Rauscher, Pierce received a com-
mission or owned any interest in NTE. He 
assumed that the supervisor knew the bro-
kers were promoting NTE. 
The complaint alleged that Harvey and 
Farrell had violated Rule 10b-5 by misrepre-
senting certain facts in connection with the 
NTE investment Rauscher, Pierce was al-
leged to be liable as an "aider and abettor" of 
the Rule 10b-5 violation, as a "controlling 
person" within 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a), and under 
the theory of respondeat superior. The dis-
trict court granted Rauscher, Pierce's motion 
for summary judgment on all of these claims. 
The court also denied appellants' motion for 
sanctions against Rauscher, Pierce on the 
basis of their motion to disqualify appellants' 
counsel, and affirmed the magistrate's order 
granting Rauscher, Pierce's request for at-
torney's fees incurred in bringing a motion 
for a protective order. 
II. Rule 56(f) Continuance. 
[1] The customers' attorney moved for a 
continuance to take the deposition of a Mr. 
Ruhl under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
56(f). Plaintiffs' counsel represented that he 
believed Mr. Ruhl would testify that the 
stockbrokers' supervisor 
about the NTE venture. The judge did not 
abuse his discretion in denying the motion. 
Plaintiffs offered no reason why they did not 
depose Mr. Ruhl during the 27 months from 
the date the lawsuit was filed to the close of 
discovery. 
III. Summary Judgment. 
[2] We review the grant of summary 
judgment de novo, determining whether, 
viewing the evidence in the light most favor-
able to the non-moving party, there are any 
genuine issues of material fact and whether 
the district court correctly applied the rele-
vant substantive law. Federal Deposit Ins. 
Corp. v. O'Melveny & Meyers, 969 F.2d 744, 
747 (9th Cir.1992). 
A. Controlling Person. 
[3] The main issue in this case is whether 
Rauscher, Pierce is liable as a "controlling 
person" for purposes of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934. The relevant provision 
extends vicarious liability of brokerage firms 
beyond common law respondeat superior lia-
bility, subject to certain exceptions: 
Every person who, directly or indirectly, 
controls any person liable under any provi-
sion of this chapter or of any rule or 
regulation thereunder shall also be liable 
jointly and severally with and to the same 
extent as such controlled person to any 
person to whom such controlled person is 
liable, unless the controlling person acted 
in good faith and did not directly or indi-
rectly induce the act or acts constituting 
the violation or cause of action. 
15 U.S.C. § 78t(a). We held in Hollinger v. 
Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564,1573 (9th 
Cir.1990), cert, denied, 499 U.S. 976, 111 
S.Ct 1621, 113 L.Ed.2d 719 (1991), that as a 
matter of law, a broker-dealer is a controlling 
person under that provision with respect to 
its registered representatives. We reasoned 
that the securities laws impose on broker-
dealers a duty to supervise their registered 
representatives, and the representatives 
need the dealers to gain access to the securi-
ties markets. We saw no basis for a distinc-
tion between employees or other agents and 
independent contractors. The statute bases 
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knew something liability solely on the control relationship, 
subject to the good faith defense. 
We explained in Hollinger that a broker-
dealer is not necessarily liable "for all actions 
taken by its registered representatives," and 
is not an insurer of its representatives. Id. 
at 1575. In addition to the good faith de-
fense, we noted the possibility of actions by 
the stockbroker outside the firm's control: 
The broker-dealer may also, of course, rely 
on a contention that the representative was 
acting outside of the broker-dealer's statu-
tory "control." For example, [the broker-
dealer] could argue that when appellants 
entrusted their money to [the representa-
tive] they were not reasonably relying 
upon him as a registered representative of 
[the broker-dealer], but were placing the 
money with [the representative] for pur-
poses other than investment in markets to 
which [the representative] had access only 
by reason of his relationship with [the] 
broker-dealer. 
Id. at 1575-76, n. 26. We have not previous-
ly had occasion to consider what conduct by a 
representative is "outside of the broker-deal-
er's statutory control." 
The district judge carefully analyzed the 
evidence submitted on the motion for sum-
mary judgment, and, finding no genuine is-
sue of fact, held as a matter of law that this 
was an "outside" transaction for purposes of 
controlling person liability: 
However, this litigation does not involve 
the type of securities transactions that 
could only be performed through Harvey's 
and FarrelTs association with a broker-
dealer. The dispute here centers on an 
investment promoted as an interest in a 
small enterprise that was unrelated to any 
of the securities offered by Rausch-
er/Pierce through its registered agents. 
Harvey and Farrell were not acting in 
their capacity as "registered agents" of 
Rauscher/Pierce when they approached 
the plaintiffs with this supposed invest-
ment opportunity. Rather, the NTE in-
vestment scheme proposed by Harvey and 
Farrell was their own personal project, in 
which they held personal interests. On 
the other hand, Rauscher/Pierce has never 
had an interest in the venture. There has 
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Deen no evidence offered to suggest that 
Rauscher/Pierce even had any meaningful 
knowledge of the scheme or that it was the 
type of transaction that Rauscher/Pierce 
dealt with or had an interest in at all as a 
brokerage house. In fact, it was not 
Rather, the NTE "deal" was a separate 
arrangement entered into by the co-defen-
dants as private individuals, not as "regis-
tered agents" of Rauscher/Pierce. As 
such, that scheme and any related transac-
tions fall outside the scope of that activity 
that Rauscher/Pierce, as a broker, is statu-
torily required to supervise. There is no 
evidence that Harvey and Farrell used 
their "access to the trading markets" 
through Rauscher/Pierce to promote the 
NTE venture. Nor is there a suggestion 
that Harvey and Farrell could not have 
legally promoted this scheme without be-
ing registered with the SEC or with a 
broker-dealer. This was simply not a "se-
curities transaction" of the type contem-
plated by 15 U.S.C. § 77o. 
Moreover, there is no evidence to sug-
gest that the plaintiffs relied on Harvey 
and FarrelTs association with Rausch-
er/Pierce as registered agents of a broker-
dealer in their decision to invest in NTE. 
On the contrary, the deposition of plaintiff 
Willis Hauser demonstrates that he 
learned about the NTE venture through 
his association with the co-defendants in 
1984, long before Harvey and Farrell be-
came employed with Rauscher/Pierce. 
Additionally, plaintiff Rafael Acosta's depo-
sition testimony makes clear that the in-
vestment promotion by Harvey and Farrell 
was completely divorced from their rela-
tionship with Rauscher/Pierce. In fact, 
Acosta's testimony reflects the fact that 
Harvey and Farrell suggested that they 
would quit their jobs as registered agents 
of Rauscher/Pierce if they were able to get 
the NTE venture off the ground. 
In HoUinger the court explicitly recog-
nized that the "broker-dealer" rule, impos-
ing vicarious liability on brokerage houses 
as "controlling persons," could only be ap-
plied in instances where the alleged wrong-
doer was involved in transactions normally 
supervised by his/her employer under its 
15 U.S.C. § 77o statutory duty. The court 
held: 
The broker-dealer may also, of course, 
rely [as a defense] on a contention that 
the representative was acting outside of 
the broker-dealer's statutory "control". 
For example, [the defendant/broker] 
could argue that when appellants en-
trusted their money to [the co-defen-
dant/registered agent], they were not 
reasonably relying upon him as a regis-
tered representative of [the defen-
dant/broker], but were placing the mon-
ey with [the co-defendant/registered 
agent] for purposes other than invest-
ment [in markets] to which [the co~de-
fendant/registered agent] had access 
only by reason of his relationship with 
[the defendant-broker], 
HoUinger, at 1575 n. 26 (emphasis added). 
This is just such a case. 
There has been no evidence offered that 
substantiates the claim that Harvey and 
Farrell were acting in anything other than 
their individual capacity in promoting the 
NTE venture. There is no evidence which 
reasonably suggests that the plaintiffs re-
lied on Harvey and Farrell as registered 
representatives of Rauscher/Pierce in 
choosing to invest in NTE. Therefore, 
even viewing the evidence before the court 
in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, 
Rauscher/Pierce does not qualify as a "con-
trolling person" in relation to their employ-
ee/codefendants* promotion of NTE. 
Congress could not have reasonably con-
templated imposing "controlling person" li-
ability on brokerage houses for all of the 
tortious acts of their employees, no matter 
how unrelated that wrongdoing may be to 
those persons' employment Since the 
statutory duty of control imposed by 15 
U.S.C. § 77o must be limited to those 
transactions which could have reasonably 
been regulated and controlled by an em-
ployer, there can be no liability imposed 
upon the defendant Rauscher/Pierce in this 
case under the "controlling person" theory. 
Our de novo review of the record reveals 
no error in this analysis. Considering all the 
circumstances of the transactions, Mr. Hau-
ser and Mr. Acosta were not reasonably rely-
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ing upon the stockbrokers as registered rep-
resentatives of Rauscher, Pierce. They were 
placing the money with the stockbrokers for 
purposes other than investment in markets 
to which stockbrokers had access only by 
reason of their relationship with Rauscher, 
Pierce. As the district court pointed out, the 
brokers did not need Rauscher, Pierce to 
promote NTE, it was not the kind of invest-
ment for which a customer typically relies on 
a broker with access through his firm to a 
stock exchange, and Hauser bought into 
NTE before the brokers even went to work 
for Rauscher, Pierce. Acosta knew that the 
brokers were planning to quit working for 
Rauscher, Pierce so that they could devote 
more of their efforts to NTE. Rauscher, 
Pierce had no knowledge of or financial inter-
est in the NTE venture. In addition to the 
evidence expressly alluded to by the district 
judge, we note that Mr. Hauser's and Mr. 
Acosta's statements from Rauscher, Pierce 
did not list the NTE investments. Mr. Hau-
ser and Mr. Acosta did not, in the deposition 
excerpts provided to the district court, con-
tradict the brokers1 representations that they 
told the customers that the NTE investment 
would not be through Rauscher, Pierce and 
had nothing to do with Rauscher, Pierce. 
B. Aider and Abettor Liability. 
[4-7] Appellants argue that Rauscher 
Pierce is liable as an aider and abettor under 
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). This requires proof of 
three things under Durham v. Kelly, 810 
F.2d 1500, 1505 (9th Cir.1987): (1) existence 
of an independent primary wrong; (2) actual 
knowledge by the alleged aider and abettor 
of the wrong and of his or her role in further-
ing it; and (3) substantial assistance in the 
wrong. Appellants offered no evidence of 
wrong, scienter, or assistance in the wrong 
by anyone other than the stockbrokers them-
selves at Rauscher, Pierce. They argue that 
since the stockbrokers were denoted as vice-
presidents by their firm, their rank was high 
enough so that the firm must be held respon-
sible for their knowledge. But aider and 
abettor liability is a means of holding respon-
sible someone other than the wrongdoer who, 
knowing of the independent wrong and his or 
her role in furthering it, substantially assists 
in the wrong. The concept cannot be applied 
through a legal fiction to an entity which 
does not know of the wrong or its role if any 
in furthering it. 
C. Respondeat Superior Liability. 
[8] Appellants also argue that Rauscher, 
Pierce was vicariously liable under Nevada 
law doctrine of respondeat superior. The 
theory appears to be that, since the stockbro-
kers were Rauscher, Pierce employees, cus-
tomers would reasonably rely on Rauscher, 
Pierce. We recognized that such a state law 
claim is not supplanted by controlling person 
liability, in Hollinger, 914 F.2d at 1577. Ne-
vertheless, the district court correctly con-
cluded the record left room for no genuine 
issue of fact, because it established that the 
customers could not reasonably have believed 
that Rauscher, Pierce had anything to do 
with the NTE promotion. OeKLer v. Huma-
na, Inc., 105 Nev. 348, 775 P.2d 1271, 1273 
(1989); Ellis v. Nelson, 68 Nev. 410, 233 P.2d 
1072, 1076 (1951). 
IV. Sanctions. 
A. Rule 11. 
[9] Rauscher, Pierce moved to disqualify 
the customers' attorney on the ground that 
he interviewed one of the stockbrokers, at 
about the same time that the stockbroker 
was going back to work for Rauscher, Pierce, 
without notifying Rauscher, Pierce's attor-
ney. The Nevada ethical rule, S.C.R. 182, 
like Model Rule of Professional Conduct 4.2, 
prohibited a lawyer from communicating 
about the subject of representation with a 
party, or persons whose conduct would be 
imputed to the party, whom the lawyer knew 
to be represented, except with consent of the 
other lawyer or authorization by law. Basi-
cally the motion accused the customers' at-
torney of going behind the back of the bro-
kerage firm's attorney to the stockbroker. 
The judge demed the motion for disqualifica-
tion, and also denied plaintiffs' motion for 
Rule 11 sanctions. Plaintiffs appeal the deni-
al of Rule 11 sanctions. Although the court 
ultimately had denied the motion to disquali-
fy, the question was close. The judge did not 
abuse his discretion. Cooler & Gell v. Hart-
marx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405, 110 S.Ct 
2447, 2460, 110 L.Ed.2d 359 (1990); Moore v. 
Local Union 569 of the Int'l BhdL of Elec. 
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Workers, 989 F.2d 1534, 1537 (9th Cir.1993). 
The motion was by no means frivolous, legal-
ly unreasonable, without legal foundation, or 
brought for any improper purpose. 
B. Discovery Sanction. 
[10,11] Plaintiffs' counsel on January 24 
noticed up the depositions of the stockbro-
kers' secretary and "the person most knowl-
edgeable of Rauscher Pierce Refsnes, Inc." 
for February 19 and 20, at plaintiffs' attor-
neys' office in Las Vegas. Defense counsel 
asked him to change the dates, because Feb-
ruary 19 was a legal holiday, and he had a 
trial beginning February 20 in a case which 
he had been handling exclusively for many 
years. He offered numerous alternative 
dates. The magistrate not only granted de-
fense counsel's motion for a protective order, 
but also ordered plaintiffs to pay $1,600 to 
defendant as the reasonable expenses includ-
ing attorneys' fees of seeking the protective 
order, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
26(c). We review for clear error, Grimes v. 
City and County of San Francisco, 951 F.2d 
236, 240 (9th Cir.1991), and find none. Ob-
structive refusal to make reasonable accom-
modation, such as plaintiff exhibited, not only 
impairs the civility of our profession and the 
pleasures of the practice of law, but also 
needlessly increases litigation expense to 
clients. 
AFFIRMED. 
The PEOPLE OF the TERRITORY 
OF GUAM, Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v. 
Thomas V. McGRAVEY, Defendant-
Appellant. 
No. 92-10003. 
United States Court of Appeals, 
Ninth Circuit 
Argued and Submitted Nov. 4, 1992. 
Decided Jan. 14, 1994. 
Defendant appealed from order entered 
by the Appellate Division of the District 
Court of Guam, affirming his convictions for 
first and second-degree criminal sexual as-
sault on a minor. The Court of Appeals, 
William A. Norris, Circuit Judge, held that: 
(1) instruction that victim's testimony did not 
have to be corroborated if victim was be-
lieved beyond a reasonable doubt did not, 
when viewed in context of instructions as a 
whole, accord special weight to victim's testi-
mony, (2) instruction that support person 
would be allowed to be present during "child-
victim's" testimony did not improperly single 
out victim from other witnesses; and (3) 
Guam law did not require that trial court 
give special child witness instruction, and 
court in instant case was justified in refusing 
to give such special instruction. 
Affirmed. 
Reinhardt, Circuit Judge, dissented and 
filed opinion. 
1. Criminal Law <3=»770(3) 
Trial judge has substantial latitude in 
formulating jury instructions so long as in-
structions fairly and adequately cover issues 
presented. 
2. Criminal Law <3»1152(1) 
Jury instructions, even if imperfect, are 
not basis for overturning conviction absent 
showing that they constitute abuse of trial 
court's discretion. 
3. Criminal Law <S»822(14) 
When viewed in context of instructions 
as a whole, instruction in prosecution relating 
to sexual abuse of child that no corroboration 
of victim's testimony was necessary if victim 
was believed beyond a reasonable doubt did 
not improperly imply that jury was to evalu-
ate victim's testimony differently and more 
favorably; jury was fully instructed that it 
was not to treat testimony of victim any 
differently from testimony of any other wit-
ness, and nothing in instructions would cause 
reasonable juror to believe that defendant 
was required to produce corroborating evi-
dence in support of his testimony. 
